9% of Young French People Believe Their Generation Will Live Better Than Their Parents
In January 2026, the McKinsey Global Institute published a study on the attitudes of young Europeans towards the future. The striking figure: only 9% of young French people believe their generation will live better than that of their parents. In Germany, the rate is less than 10%. In China and India, it exceeds 60%.
This gap between Europe and emerging countries is not new. But it has widened since the pandemic, and it poses a concrete question for European societies: how do democracies function when a majority of their young citizens no longer believe in progress?
---
The Data, In Detail
The McKinsey study surveyed 22,000 people in 18 countries, including 5 European countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Poland). It measures attitudes on economic future, social mobility, trust in institutions, and personal aspirations.
France stands out for a particularly pronounced pessimism. According to the Ipsos "What Worries the World" survey from December 2025, 91% of French people have a negative view of their country's future. This is the highest rate among the 30 countries surveyed. 85% believe that 2025 was a bad year for France. Only 41% say they are optimistic for 2026.
The Autumn 2025 Eurobarometer, published in February 2026, nuances this picture. Among young Europeans aged 15 to 30, 50% declare themselves optimistic about the future of the world in general, but 76% are optimistic about their own future and that of their family. This paradox has been stable for several years: Europeans are pessimistic about the world, but relatively confident about their personal trajectory.
The Allianz Foundation study, published in January 2026 and covering 8,500 young people aged 16 to 39 in France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and Spain, adds an additional dimension. 47% of respondents reported having championed a cause at work or school. 29% indicated that their ethical concerns influenced their choice of employer. A majority expressed attachment to democratic values and support for ambitious ecological reforms.
---
A Pessimism with History
The pessimism of the French is not a new phenomenon. Comparative surveys conducted since the 1990s show that France consistently ranks among the most pessimistic countries in the Western world, even during periods of economic growth. Political science researchers refer to "French gloom" or "structural French pessimism."
Several explanations have been put forward. The first is cultural: the French intellectual tradition values criticism and distrust of technical and economic progress. French philosophers and essayists who garner the most public attention are often those who describe decline, catastrophe, or the end of a world.
The second explanation is institutional. Trust in public institutions, political parties, and the media is particularly low in France. According to the Sciences Po / CEVIPOF trust barometer from January 2026, 72% of French people distrust political parties, 61% distrust the government, and 54% distrust the media. This generalized distrust colors the perception of the future.
The third explanation is economic. Since 2008, France has experienced a succession of crises (financial crisis, Eurozone crisis, pandemic, inflation) which have indeed deteriorated the living conditions for a segment of the population, particularly the middle classes and young people entering the labor market. The feeling that "things are getting worse" is not entirely irrational.
---
What Pessimism Doesn't Tell Us
However, the pessimism of young Europeans, and French people in particular, does not accurately reflect their objective situation. Several indicators show that the generation born in the 1990s and 2000s lives in objectively better material and health conditions than their parents at the same age.
Life expectancy at birth in France is 82.3 years in 2024, compared to 74 years in 1980. The infant mortality rate is 3.5 per 1,000 live births, compared to 10 in 1980. The level of education has significantly increased: 55% of a generation now obtains the baccalauréat and pursues higher education, compared to 20% in 1980.
The unemployment rate for 15-24 year olds in France is 17% in 2025, a high figure but down from the 2012 peak of 26%. In Germany, it is 6%. In Nordic countries, it is less than 10%. The geographical and professional mobility of young Europeans is greater than that of their parents, thanks notably to Erasmus+ and free movement within the EU.
This discrepancy between the objective situation and subjective perception is documented in numerous studies. It is partly explained by availability bias: bad news is more salient and memorable than good news. Social networks amplify this bias by favoring anxiety-provoking content, which generates more engagement.
---
The Paradox of Personal Optimism and Collective Pessimism
The most interesting result of the 2025 Eurobarometer is the gap between personal optimism and collective pessimism. 76% of young Europeans are optimistic about their own future, but only 50% are optimistic about the future of the world.
This paradox is not unique to Europe. Studies in social psychology show that individuals systematically evaluate their personal situation more favorably than the general situation. This phenomenon is called the "better-than-average effect" or, in its collective version, the "third-person effect": others are doing worse than me.
But in Europe, this gap is particularly pronounced. It reflects a disconnection between lived experience (which is often satisfactory) and the collective narrative (which is often catastrophist). This disconnection has political consequences: it creates fertile ground for discourses that promise to "change everything" or to "restore greatness" to a country that, in perceptions, is in constant decline.
---
What Young Europeans Do in the Face of Pessimism
The pessimism of young Europeans does not translate into political or social passivity. On the contrary, the Allianz Foundation study shows a high level of engagement on environmental, social, and democratic issues.
47% of respondents reported having championed a cause at work or school. This figure is higher among women (52%) than men (42%), and higher in Southern European countries (Italy, Spain) than in Northern countries. The most frequently championed causes are the environment (38%), equal rights (29%), and the fight against discrimination (24%).
29% of respondents indicated that their ethical concerns influenced their choice of employer. This figure is up from 2022 (22%), suggesting that companies that do not consider social and environmental issues will increasingly struggle to attract young talent.
Democratic engagement is also strong. A majority of respondents express attachment to democratic values and opposition to authoritarian regimes. This result is particularly marked in Poland, where the memory of communism remains vivid, and in Spain, where the democratic transition is still fresh in family memories.
---
The Role of Media and Social Networks
The question of the media's role in shaping pessimism is central. Studies show that exposure to negative news increases pessimism, regardless of the objective situation. Traditional media, under audience pressure, tend to overrepresent bad news.
Social networks amplify this phenomenon. TikTok, Instagram, and X algorithms favor content that generates strong emotional reactions, whether positive or negative. Anxiety-provoking content (disasters, conflicts, scandals) generates more engagement than positive content, which creates an overrepresentation of the negative in news feeds.
A University of Oxford study published in 2025 measured the impact of reduced social media exposure on well-being and pessimism. Participants who reduced their TikTok and Instagram usage by 50% for four weeks reported a 15% increase in their sense of well-being and a 12% reduction in their anxiety about the future.
This result does not mean that social networks are the sole cause of pessimism. But it suggests that the informational environment in which young Europeans evolve contributes to distorting their perception of reality in a negative direction.
---
The Cost of Pessimism
The pessimism of young Europeans has concrete economic and social costs. Studies in behavioral economics show that pessimism reduces the propensity to invest, to undertake, and to take calculated risks. Individuals who do not believe in the future are less inclined to train, to save, and to engage in long-term projects.
At the macroeconomic level, pessimism can become self-fulfilling. If households anticipate a deterioration of their situation, they reduce their consumption, which effectively slows growth. If entrepreneurs anticipate weak demand, they invest less, which effectively reduces productivity.
Economists like Olivier Blanchard have highlighted this mechanism in the case of France, where low household and business confidence contributes to explaining structurally weaker growth than in comparable countries.
---
What This Topic Says About JdP
The "Journal d'un Progressiste, Wanting to be 20 Today" exists precisely because this pessimism is real and documented. Its editorial gamble is to show, backed by data, that the world is improving on many indicators, while acknowledging the real problems that persist.
This is not naive optimism. It is a rigorous reading of data that refuses to let the catastrophist narrative occupy the field alone. The 9% of young French people who believe their generation will live better than their parents deserve to be joined by more of their contemporaries, not because everything is fine, but because the facts, honestly read, provide serious reasons for hope.
---
What Public Policies Can Do
The pessimism of young Europeans is not inevitable. Specific public policies can address its structural causes.
The first cause is economic: the difficulty for young people to access stable employment and affordable housing. In France, the homeownership rate among those under 30 fell from 25% in 2000 to 15% in 2024. This trend reflects rising real estate prices in major cities and the precariousness of early career paths. Policies for affordable housing and securing career paths (such as the "garantie jeunes", expanded in 2025) can reduce this source of anxiety.
The second cause is informational: overexposure to bad news via social networks. Studies show that media and information literacy (MIL) reduces negativity bias and improves the ability to critically evaluate information. In France, MIL has been integrated into school curricula since 2018, but its implementation remains uneven across establishments.
The third cause is institutional: distrust of institutions. Reforms that improve transparency, citizen participation, and the accountability of elected officials can gradually rebuild this trust. Experiences in participatory democracy (citizen conventions, participatory budgets) show that citizens who directly participate in decision-making have a more positive view of institutions.
Sources
1. McKinsey Global Institute, "Transforming Europe: Bold Moves to Lift a Continent", janvier 2026, mckinsey.com
2. Allianz Foundation, "Next Generations Study 2026", janvier 2026, allianz.com
3. Ipsos, "What Worries the World", décembre 2025, ipsos.com
4. Eurobaromètre Automne 2025, Commission européenne, février 2026, ec.europa.eu
5. CEVIPOF / Sciences Po, "Baromètre de la confiance politique", janvier 2026, cevipof.com
6. INSEE, "Tableaux de l'économie française 2025", insee.fr
7. Université d'Oxford, étude sur l'impact des réseaux sociaux sur le bien-être, 2025
8. Blanchard, O., "Fiscal Policy under Low Interest Rates", MIT Press, 2023
